Saint Louis University Public Law Review
Volume 32
Number 1 Control of Police Misconduct in a
Post-Exclusionary Rule World: Can It Be Done?
(Volume XXXII, No. 1)

Article 7

2012

Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of
Making Police Reforms Endure
Samuel Walker
University of Nebraska at Omaha, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, samwalker@unomaha.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Walker, Samuel (2012) "Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police
Reforms Endure," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INSTITUTIONALIZING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY REFORMS:
THE PROBLEM OF MAKING POLICE REFORMS ENDURE

SAMUEL WALKER*
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINING POLICE REFORMS
The history of police reform in America, in the sense of modern day
notions of police professionalization, is more than a century old.1 Over that
time period there have been successive waves of reform movements, with a
changing set of objectives and programs.2 Much has been accomplished to
improve policing over this long period.3 Whether the benchmark is onehundred years, fifty years or only twenty years ago, it is possible to see
significant reforms in police management, crime fighting tactics, police
personnel standards and training, the diversity of the work force, constitutional
standards for policing, and the accountability of officers for their actions in
critical situations. The community oriented policing (COP) movement,
moreover, represents a fundamental change in thinking about the role of the
police in society that rejects the professional model that dominated police
thinking for most of the twentieth century about how police organizations
should attempt to fulfill that role.4
Nonetheless, reformers and police scholars alike have given little attention
to the question of ensuring that achieved reforms endure and become a
permanent part of an individual department or of policing in general.5 The
police literature contains only a few references to the institutionalization or
sustainability of reforms, and the discussions are typically very brief.6 Part of
the problem, Stephen Mastrofski and James Willis importantly note, is that
police scholars face enormous difficulties in tracking “changes in police

* Samuel Walker, Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
1. SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM ix (1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Jack R. Greene, Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure,
and Function of the Police, in 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 312 (Julie Horney ed., 2000).
5. See Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and
Change: Into the Twenty-first Century, in 39 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 55,
57 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010).
6. See id. at 75–76.
57
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organizations over long time periods.”7 Scholars are naturally averse to
examining subjects that pose serious measurement problems. Lawrence
Sherman cynically noted more than thirty years ago that in studying the
persistence of anti-corruption reforms it is almost impossible to determine if “a
department was truly reformed to begin with.”8
The lack of interest in institutionalizing reform is all the more remarkable
because of the growing literature on police reform itself. David Bayley noted
years ago that the late twentieth century has been arguably “the most creative
period in policing” since the creation of the modern police in 1829.9 Several
scholars have attempted to survey various reforms, which include community
policing, problem-oriented policing, hot-spots policing, anti-terrorist police
policies, major innovations in accountability, significant changes in police
technology, and dramatic changes in the composition of the police work
force.10 Wesley Skogan systematically listed and discussed the reasons “Why
[police] Reforms Fail,” finding eleven separate factors.11 While extremely
valuable, his article did not discuss how those various obstacles might be
overcome in order to enhance the sustainability of reform.12
Only two publications to date have explored the issue of institutionalizing
police reforms in detail.13 Rachel Boba and John Crank define
institutionalization as “establish[ing] as normal or mak[ing] something a
customary and accepted part of the organization.”14 With regard to problemoriented policing as a reform, they argue that responsibility for the reform must
be “distributed across the rank structure . . . integrat[ing] problem solving,
analysis, and accountability at all levels” of the organization.15 Similarly, Trent

7. Id. at 127.
8. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM: CONTROLLING POLICE
CORRUPTION 261–62 (1978).
9. DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 101 (1994).
10. Mastrofski & Willis, supra note 5, at 117; David H. Bayley, Police Reform: Who Done
It?, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 7, 8 (2008); Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING &
SOC’Y 23, 23 (2008); see also INTERNATIONAL POLICE EXECUTIVE SYMPOSIUM, POLICE
REFORM FROM THE BOTTOM UP (Monique Marks & David Sklansky eds., 2012).
11. Skogan, supra note 10, at 23.
12. See id.
13. See TRENT IKERD & SAMUEL WALKER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICING SERV., MAKING POLICE REFORMS ENDURE: THE KEYS FOR SUCCESS 5
(2010), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e04106264_policereforms_fin.pdf;
Rachel Boba & John P. Crank, Institutionalizing Problem-Oriented Policing: Rethinking
Problem-Solving, Analysis, and Accountability, 9 POLICE PRACT. & RES. 379, 379 (2008).
14. Boba & Crank, supra note 13, at 384.
15. Id. at 385, 391. In his twenty-year assessment of problem-oriented policing, Scott argues
that it will have “succeeded” when it has been “integrated” into a department’s operations “at
least as completely as . . . other operational strategies” of patrol, response to incidents, and
investigation. MICHAEL S. SCOTT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED
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Ikerd and this Author define institutionalization as occurring when a particular
reform becomes “a way of regularly conducting police business,” and “when
certain norms, values, and structures are incorporated into an organization.”16
As discussed in detail later, this can be achieved when the reform in question is
incorporated into regular police practice, in department-wide training, and in
personnel practices including regular performance evaluations and
promotions.17
Reformers undoubtedly have been so engaged in the struggle just to
achieve a particular reform that they have not been able to think about the
long-term future. Today, the continuity of police reforms is a problem that
cannot be ignored. This Article examines the issue of the continuity of
accountability-related reforms,18 but has general applicability and relevance to
community oriented policing (COP),19 problem oriented policing (POP),20 and
essentially all significant police reforms.
Accountability-related reforms are defined in this Article as (1) policies
and procedures designed to ensure that police officers obey the law and, also,
policies on treating citizens in a lawful, respectful, and unbiased manner; (2)
policies and procedures ensuring that incidents of alleged misconduct are
properly reported and then investigated thoroughly and fairly; (3) policies and
procedures ensuring that proven incidents of misconduct result in appropriate
discipline; and (4) policies and procedures ensuring that police departments
take proactive steps to prevent officer misconduct in the future. Section I of
this Article provides a brief history of notable police reforms that eventually
faded away. Section II provides a very brief history of the major reform efforts
in policing, with a discussion of why those reforms generally failed to develop
mechanisms to ensure their own continuity. Section III discusses the issue of
the police officer subculture—and the related issue of police unions—which
many, if not most, police experts believe are major obstacles to all police
reforms and accountability–related reforms in particular. Section IV covers
recent federal pattern or practice investigations and settlements because they
represent the most concerted effort at present to change police organizations as
a whole—raising important questions about the continuity of the effort itself
and the specific reforms that are mandated. Section V develops a framework

POLICING SERV., PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS
132 (2000).
16. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 5.
17. See discussion infra Part V.B.
18. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING POLICE INTEGRITY: EXAMPLES OF
PROMISING POLICE PRACTICES AND POLICIES 10–13 (2001) (providing the best short statement
of the specific policies and programs designed to achieve accountability); see also SAMUEL
WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 20–21 (2005).
19. Greene, supra note 4, at 301.
20. SCOTT, supra note 15, at 1–4.
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for both institutionalizing accountability-related reforms and also for assessing
the extent to which such reforms have been institutionalized.21
I. THE LONG HISTORY OF REFORMS THAT JUST FADE AWAY
There is a long history of major police reforms (that is, reforms that were
considered important in their time) that simply faded away.22 Particularly
notable in this regard were the anti-corruption reforms instituted in the New
York City Police Department (NYPD) in the early 1970s in the wake of the
“Serpico” scandal and the subsequent Knapp Commission investigation.23
Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy introduced anti-corruption reforms
that attempted to both decentralize responsibility for identifying and
investigating alleged corrupt activities while also strengthening the centralized
Internal Affairs Division (IAD) which had overall responsibility for integrity
within the NYPD.24 Murphy’s decentralization strategy is particularly relevant
for the discussion in this Article because it was intended to enhance the sense
of responsibility for integrity throughout the department and thereby change
the culture of the department. Among other things, it was intended to end the
traditional “us versus them” view among rank and file officers that internal
affairs represented “head hunters” whose mission was to “get” them, and in
this respect create a department-wide commitment to accountability.25
Yet, three decades later another major corruption scandal erupted in the
NYPD, and the resulting Mollen Commission investigation found that the
Murphy anti-corruption reforms had simply evaporated.26 In fact, the Mollen
Commission reported that the integrity problem in the NYPD had worsened,
with the emergence of a new form of corruption that combined traditional
money-related corrupt actions with officer violence against criminal suspects.27
The Mollen Commission concluded that the earlier reforms had collapsed

21. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 13–15.
22. WALKER, supra note 18, at 161.
23. KNAPP COMM’N, THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 16–18,
231 (1972). Reforms already underway at the time of the report, and recommendations for longterm reform. Id. at 1–34, 231–44. “Serpico” became the popular shorthand name for a scandal
that was far broader than the activities of officer Frank Serpico. Id. at 196–201.
24. Id. at 22–23, 30–34.
25. PATRICK V. MURPHY & THOMAS PLATE, COMMISSIONER: A VIEW FROM THE TOP OF
AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 162–65 (1978); SHERMAN, supra note 8, at 128–30; THE N.Y.C.
COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
PROCEDURES OF THE DEP’T, COMMISSION REPORT 15, 74–75 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN
COMMISSION] (describing the 1970s reforms); see also Aogán Mulcahy, ‘Headhunter’ or ‘Real
Cop’?: Identity in the World of Internal Affairs Officers, 24 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 99,
105–09 (1995).
26. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 76.
27. Id. at 17.
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because “no institutional mechanism” was created to ensure that they
functioned as intended.28 The lesson of the NYPD experience appears to be
that simply introducing new policies and procedures is inadequate without
special attention to ensuring both full implementation and continuity over time.
A second notable example of a failed reform is the Team Policing
experiment that briefly swept through American policing in the 1970s.29 A
1978 survey reported that innumerable police departments were engaged in
Team Policing.30 Almost completely forgotten today, Team Policing was a half
step in the direction of community policing, embodying some of the principles
that would later flourish, but lacking a number of key ingredients.31 It sought to
bring police operations closer to neighborhoods through decentralization—as
does COP. But it did not involve a broader rethinking about the police role that
characterizes COP, nor did it fully consider how an alternative way of
delivering police services would be integrated into the traditional
organizational structure and procedures.32 Beset by unresolved conceptual
problems, poor planning, and implementation problems, Team Policing
collapsed almost as quickly as it had arisen and was soon forgotten.33 In a
telling comment on how reforms fade away, a former NYPD official stated in
the mid-1980s that, “[t]here was no memo announcing the formal end of the
[Team Policing] experiment” in the department.34
A third example of a major reform (although the ultimate outcome is still
uncertain) is community oriented policing (COP) and its first cousin, problem
oriented policing (POP), which represent the major police reform efforts of the
last thirty years.35 COP involves a rethinking of the police role, with an
emphasis on closer relations with communities and neighborhoods.36 The key
organizational changes involve the decentralization of police services and the
development of crime and disorder policies tailored to each neighborhood.37
POP—which is more of a strategy that incorporates important elements of
28. Id. at 16–17 (the “new” corruption”), 75 (“no institutional mechanisms”), 70–109 (full
discussion of the “collapse”). It is important to note that Commissioner Murphy left the NYPD
shortly after his anti-corruption reforms were initiated and he avoided the challenge of fully
instituting them. MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25, at 16.
29. SHERMAN ET AL., TEAM POLICING: SEVEN CASE STUDIES 107–08 (1973); GAY ET AL.,
NEIGHBORHOOD TEAM POLICING ix (1977).
30. JOHN F. HEAPHY, POLICE PRACTICES: THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY 12
(1978).
31. GARY GORDNER, COMMUNITY POLICING: PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS 1 (1996).
32. Greene, supra note 4, at 307, 328–29.
33. Samuel Walker, Does Anyone Remember Team Policing? Lessons of the Team Policing
Experience for Community Policing, 12 AM. J. POLICE 33, 34–35 (1993).
34. Id. at 46.
35. SCOTT, supra note 15, at 97–99.
36. Greene, supra note 4, at 301.
37. Id. at 307.
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COP—involves disaggregating the categories of crime and disorder and
developing carefully targeted responses to particular “problems” (e.g.,
residential burglaries, graffiti, etc.).38 The availability of large amounts of
federal funding in the 1990s resulted in COP being adopted by innumerable
police departments across the country.39 The initial enthusiasm has long since
passed. And while the concept survives as conventional rhetoric, there is no
national assessment of the extent to which the key organizational aspects
survive as an operational reality in various departments.40 With regard to POP,
a national center provides both a focus for the concept and abundant
information about current activities across the country.41
The COP experience raises the same issue discussed above with regard to
the anti-corruption efforts in the NYPD in the 1970s.42 It appears there was no
recognition of the problem of maintaining an innovation and no attempt to
develop mechanisms to ensure the continuity of COP once the initial
enthusiasm waned, or the federal grant expired.43 The situation with respect to
POP, however, is more hopeful. The Center on Problem Oriented Policing at
the University of Wisconsin maintains a focus on the concept with a broad
program of publications, a national competition for a national award, and an
annual conference that helps to keep the concept revitalized.44 As discussed
below, at least one department did institute policy and procedural changes
designed to institutionalize POP in the department and ensure its continuity.45

38. See, e.g., Problem Specific Guides, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING,
http://www.popcenter.org/problems (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (listing some problems which can
be addressed by POP).
39. Greene, supra note 4, at 301–02.
40. Greene, supra note 4, at 327. For COP–related examples see Skogan, supra note 10, at
25–26, 27, 29–30, 33.
41. Mission of the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED
POLICING, http://www.popcenter.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). The future of the Center
is in doubt, as the Justice Department indicated in the fall of 2012 that it would cease its financial
support.
42. See MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 74.
43. Id. at 75. The most ambitious COP effort was the Chicago Police Department’s Chicago
Alternative Policing Services (CAPS) program. The extensive evaluations over the course of
several years found positive results in a number of dimensions. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN T.
HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING CHICAGO STYLE 20 (1997). CAPS is still mentioned on the
Chicago Police Department website, along with an extensive program of “beat meetings” that
were a core element of CAPS, but anecdotal evidence raises questions about whether the
department and the city are still fully committed to the program. See How CAPS Works, CHI.
POLICE DEP’T, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/
How%20CAPS%20works (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
44. See POP Conference, CTR. FOR PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING, http://www.popcenter.
org/conference (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (describing POP conference and the competition).
45. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 11–12; see also infra pp. 25–29.
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Federal pattern and practice investigations under Section 14141 of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 represent a final
example of a major police organizational reform effort.46 It is particularly
relevant for this topic as a broad effort to introduce accountability-related
reforms in police departments. To date, Justice Department investigations have
resulted in over twenty settlements involving consent decrees or memoranda of
agreement (MOA) requiring major reforms.47 The principal reforms—common
to all the consent decrees and MOA—involve developing state of the art use of
force policies, an early intervention system, and creating an open and
accessible citizen complaint process.48 As that effort is still ongoing, it is still
too early to provide a final assessment of its success.49
There is some preliminary evidence that the pattern or practice effort has
been successful in a number of departments.50 The reports of the independent
court-appointed monitors in several of these cases have reported significant
success.51 In Washington, D.C., after six and a half years of MOA ordered
reforms, the monitor reported in 2008 that the department had “substantially
transformed itself,” and recommended termination of the MOA.52 Similarly,

46. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A
Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 479 (2008).
47. Id. ; SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (describing the work of the Special
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice).
48. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 487.
49. Id. at 481.
50. Id. Walker and Macdonald relied primarily on the reports of the court-appointed
monitors for their assessment of the impact of the various consent decrees and MOAs. Id. at 515.
There are concededly some risks in relying heavily on those sources. Id. The major exception is
Detroit, where the monitoring process has been embroiled in scandal. Former Detroit Police
Monitor Censured – Not Disbarred – For Fling with Kwame Kilpatrick, MLIVE (Oct. 21, 2011,
11:27 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/10/former_detroit_police_moni
tor_2.html. The Settlement Agreement regarding the Oakland, California, Police Department was
the result of a private law suit, but the Agreement is identical in content to the settlements
resulting from Justice Department litigation. Press Release, City of Oakland, Office of the City
Attorney, City of Oakland Settles ‘Riders’ Civil Rights Suits (Feb. 19, 2003), http://www.oak
landcityattorney.org/PDFS/Riders/Riders%20final%20settlement.pdf. As of summer 2012, the
federal judge in the case was extremely frustrated by the failure to implement the Agreement after
nine years, and has threatened to place the police department in “receivership.” The exact nature
of receivership, which has no known precedent in policing, is unknown. See Matthew Artz,
Attorneys Want Investigation into Oakland Leak of Allegations Against Federal Monitor,
OAKLAND TRIBUNE (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:58:12AM), http://www.insidebayarea.com/oakland/ci_213
78091/attorneys-want-investigation-into-oakland-leak.
51. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 479–80.
52. MICHAEL BROMWICH, INDEPENDENT POLICE MONITOR: TWENTY-THIRD QUARTERLY
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 4
(2008).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

64

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:57

the monitor for the New Jersey State Police reported in 2007 that the agency
had become “self-monitoring and self-correcting.”53
Recent news reports, however, have raised questions about whether the
reforms in some of the departments where consent decrees or MOA were
successfully terminated remain viable.54 In September 2011, for example, it
was reported that twenty-three officers had been arrested on criminal charges
so far that year in Washington, D.C.55 A September 2012 news story,
meanwhile, reported that over ninety officers had been arrested on criminal
charges in the previous three and a half years.56 Arrest on any charge for a
police officer is concerning, but the number of arrests in this department—with
some of the arrests involving sex with a minor, burglary, and shooting of
transgendered people—raises very serious questions about whether the
accountability procedures instituted by the MOA are functioning at all.57
Meanwhile, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a police officer remained on duty in
2012 despite three separate allegations of attempts to extort sexual favors from
women in cases between 2008 and 2012.58 Additionally, in 2011 it was
revealed that an officer was on duty despite thirty-three citizen complaints and
that another officer had two-dozen complaints.59 All of the cases cited here
involve the kind of pattern of officer misconduct that the consent decree
mandate reforms, and the early intervention systems (discussed infra in
Part V.B), are designed to track.60
There has been no systematic inquiry into the current state of police
departments where consent decrees or MOAs have been terminated to

53. PUBLIC MGMT. RES. & LITE, DEPALMA, GREENBERG & RIVAS, MONITORS’ SIXTEENTH
REPORT 4 (2007), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/monitors-report-16.pdf.
54. Scott McCabe, 23 D.C. Cops Charged with Crimes in 2011, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 19,
2012, 2:42PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/23-d.c.-cops-charged-with-crimes-in-2011/
article/118035#.UEODfWgm_FJ.
55. Id. ; see also 16 D.C. Police Officers Arrested So Far This Year, WUSA9, (June 16,
2011, 10:20PM), http://wusa9.com/news/article/155215/158/16-DC-Police-Officers-Arrested-SoFar-This-Year..
56. Aubrey Whelan, 90-plus Arrests of D.C. Cops in Under 4 Years, WASH. EXAMINER
(Sept. 9, 2012, 8:00PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/90-plus-arrests-of-d.c.-cops-in-under-4years/article/2507386#.UIgLk2l25ak.
57. McCabe, supra note 54.
58. Margaret Harding, Pittsburgh Police Defend Handling of Suspected Officer,
PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE–REVIEW (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/
news/pittsburgh/print_782627.html.
59. Id.; Lauren Daley, Pittsburgh Police Officer Subject of Multiple Allegations,
PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/pittsburghpolice-officer-subject-of-multiple-allegations/Content?oid=1381169; ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL.,
TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT
DECREE 5 (2002), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/pittsburgh_9-02.pdf.
60. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 7–8.
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determine whether the achieved reforms are still viable several years after the
fact.61 The incidents cited above, while concededly anecdotal, raise serious
questions about the reforms that were achieved in those departments. A
systematic study of several post-consent decree departments would yield
valuable evidence on the continuity of reforms and the factors associated with
success or failure in that regard.
II. PAST APPROACHES TO POLICE REFORM
A discussion of making police reforms endure requires an examination of
past police reform strategies to highlight their shortcomings with regard to the
continuity of reforms that were attempted and in many instances, at least in
part, achieved.
Police reform between the 1920s and the 1960s relied primarily on a strong
police chief executive who would effect change in a top-down strategy.62 The
most famous examples were August Vollmer,63 O.W. Wilson,64 Clarence
Kelley,65 and Patrick V. Murphy.66 These individuals achieved commendable
and overdue reforms in the departments they led, particularly with regard to
raising personnel standards and introducing concepts of modern organizational
management.67 Additionally, these individuals served as important role models
for chiefs and future chiefs in other jurisdictions, and in many instances trained
subordinates who went on to become chiefs elsewhere.68 The obvious problem
with the strong chief approach to reform is that chiefs all eventually leave their

61. Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 376
(2011).
62. Craig D. Uchida, The Development of the American Police: An Historical Overview, in
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 18–21 (Geoffrey P. Alpert & Roger
G. Dunham eds., 4th ed. 2001).
63. See AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 3–4, 8 (1936) (there is no
biography of Vollmer).
64. See WILLIAM J. BOPP, “O.W”: O.W. WILSON AND THE SEARCH FOR A POLICE
PROFESSION 102–07 (1977).
65. See e.g., GEORGE KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL
EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 5 (1974) (explaining Clarence Kelley’s key role in
sponsoring the historic preventive patrol study in Kansas City while he was chief of the
department), available at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/kcppe.pdf.
66. See MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25, at 130–37.
67. See VOLLMER, supra note 63; see also BOPP, supra note 64; see also KELLING ET AL.,
supra note 65; see also MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25.
68. Craig Fisher, PERF Report Offers Police Leaders’ Perspectives On Immigration
Enforcement, SUBJECT TO DEBATE (Police Executive Research Forum, D.C.), Jan./Feb. 2012, at
2–3, available at http://www.policeforum.org/library/subject-to-debate/2012/Debate_Jan-Feb
2012_web1.pdf.
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departments.69 In all of the cases cited in this Article, while certain reforms
remained in place, they did not establish institutional mechanisms that would
ensure the continuity of many of their reforms.70 The case of Patrick V.
Murphy’s anti-corruption reforms in New York City cited supra illustrates the
problem.71 As a result, thinking about police reform began to advance beyond
the focus on a strong leader and started considering institutional reforms that
would last beyond the tenure of any chief executive.
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing until today, the principal focus of
police reform has been administrative rulemaking to control officer behavior
on the street.72 Administrative rulemaking involves developing formal written
policies to guide officer discretion in critical incidents such as the use of
deadly force,73 other forms of less-than-lethal force, handling domestic
violence incidents,74 and high speed vehicle pursuits.75 The evidence indicates
that several of these reforms achieved significant results in reducing the
inappropriate and harmful police conduct as intended—particularly with the
use of deadly force and high-speed vehicle pursuits.76
The major limitation of the administrative rulemaking approach to reform
relates directly to the issue of the organizational culture of a police department,
which is at the heart of the problem of making reforms endure.77 A written
policy (e.g., on less-than-lethal force), no matter how well crafted, is nothing

69. Skogan, supra note 10, at 32–33 (arguing that “[r]eform may not survive leadership
transition” as a major reason why police reforms fail, and citing a number of very telling
examples illustrating the point).
70. See, e.g., id. (discussing how police chiefs leave their departments and new police chiefs
enter, changing the former chief’s reforms).
71. See MURPHY & PLATE, supra note 25, at 162–65 (detailing how Commissioner Murphy
left soon after putting in place anti-corruption reforms in the New York City Police Department
in the 1970s).
72. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 1950-1990, at 32 (1993); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 99–101 (1975).
73. Lorie A. Fridell, Deadly Force Policy and Practice: The Forces of Change, in HOLDING
POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 32–34 (Candace McCoy ed., 2010); William A. Geller, Deadly Force:
What We Know, 10 J. OF POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 151, 169 (1982) (discussing written policies
regarding police policy).
74. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND
DILEMMAS 253–55 (1992).
75. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LORIE A. FRIDELL, POLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS:
INSTRUMENTS OF DEADLY FORCE 117 (1992).
76. JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, POLICING
AND HOMICIDE, 1976-98: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED BY
FELONS 1–3 (2001), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ph98.pdf. Walker, supra note
33, at 48.
77. See discussion infra Part I.
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more than a piece of paper78 and will have no meaningful impact on police
conduct if it is not properly enforced through a reporting requirement,
thorough investigations, and the imposition of appropriate discipline where it is
warranted. The problem is illustrated by the 2000 Justice Department consent
decree settlement with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).79 That
settlement was far longer and more detailed than, for example, the 1997
consent decree involving the Pittsburgh Police Department. A major part of the
explanation is that the LAPD, unlike the Pittsburg Police Department, had in
place policies on the use of force that were at least close to emerging national
standards.80 The problem in the LAPD lay with the administration of those
policies, and the LAPD consent decree contains elaborate requirements
designed to improve that enforcement.81 The problem of enforcing internally
developed policies is a variant on the well-recognized problem of enforcing
Supreme Court decisions that constrain police actions. Just as the Supreme
Court has no enforcement mechanism,82 the enforcement of departmentgenerated policies depends entirely on the will of the police chief executive.83
In turn, the will of the police chief depends on the commitment of that person,
his or her administrative skills, and the power of countervailing forces such as
political influence, a police union, and the police officer subculture.84
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE POLICE OFFICER SUBCULTURE
A.

The Problematic Concept of a Police Officer Subculture

Police reformers and scholars commonly refer to the organizational culture
of policing, but this is an extremely complex phenomenon—including the
formal organizational structure of a department, its official policies and
procedures, and the generally deeply ingrained day-to-day practices. It also
includes what is called the police officer subculture.85 The officer subculture is

78. Constitutional law scholars may prefer to call them “parchment barriers.” James
Madison, Federalist Paper No. 48: The Same Subject Continued with a View to the Means of
Giving Efficacy in Practice to that Maxim, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 309 (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
79. Consent Decree, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002), available at http://www.lapdonline.org/
assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf.
80. Id. at 24–26.
81. United States v. Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 401 (9th Cir. 2002).
82. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 772–76, 816
(2012).
83. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 518, 521–22 (2004).
84. See id. at 512; see also discussion infra pp. 1–4.
85. See generally Armacost, supra note 83, at 513–14.
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defined here as the set “attitudes and values that shape officers’ behavior.”86 It
is extremely relevant to this Article because of its influence over both official
departmental policies and informal departmental practices and procedures.
While this phenomenon is widely discussed, it has been little studied.87 An
increasing number of scholars, however, have questioned whether the
traditional elements of the concept are valid.88 The police subculture
commands our attention because it is generally seen as a major obstacle to
reform and, thus, a powerful force working to erode any reforms that are in
fact achieved.89 In a review of recent police reforms, David Bayley comments
that, “[p]olice rank-and-file have not been the source of significant reform
ideas.”90 The Mollen Commission, meanwhile, concluded that in order to
reduce or eliminate corruption in the NYPD, “the [d]epartment must transform
[the] police culture.”91 If the traditional concept of the police officer subculture
is not valid—as suggested in the discussion that follows—then potential for
both implementing reforms and institutionalizing them may be greater than
most observers of the police generally believe.92
The concept of a police officer subculture is enveloped in myths and
stereotypes, many of which fly in the face of a constantly changing reality.93
The concept originated with the first important scholarly work on the police.94

86. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 51.
87. David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1211–12, 1229
(2006).
88. See Steve Herbert, Police Subculture Reconsidered, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 343, 343 (1998);
Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1209–11; Samuel Walker, Racial Minority and Female Employment
in Policing: The Implications of “Glacial Change,” 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 555, 555–56, 563–66
(1985). See infra text accompanying note 91.
89. See Herbert, supra note 88, at 363.
90. BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 7. See also Skogan, supra note 10, at 26–28 (noting also the
threat of police unions to reform).
91. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 69. The reforms proposed by the Commission,
however, involved a familiar list of professionalization reforms: improved recruitment, hiring and
training, especially integrity training, better management procedures, some changes in union
procedures, expanded drug testing, residency requirement. While admirable in and of themselves,
they do not appear to address the concerns raised in this article. Id. at 112–28.
92. See STEPHEN D. MASTROFSKI & DENNIS ROSENBAUM, NAT’L POLICE RES. PLATFORM,
RECEPTIVITY TO POLICE INNOVATION: A TALE OF TWO CITIES 1, 6–10 (2011), available at
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=715700 (“[P]olice are often conceived as traditional and
resistant to the changes that innovation requires”). The National Police Research Platform, which
is still in process, is yielding a number of studies very relevant to many of the questions raised in
this article. NATIONAL POLICE RESEARCH PLATFORM, http://www.nationalpoliceresearch.org/
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
93. See Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1213, 1231–32, 1242–43.
94. E.g., BAYLEY, supra note 9, at 11.
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The seminal work of William Westley95 and Jerome Skolnick96 established a
now stereotyped image of the police officer subculture that continues to exert a
powerful influence on both popular and scholarly thinking about the police,
although in the face of considerable evidence that it is no longer valid.97 The
original concept posits a homogenous work group, dominated by white males,
with limited education, conservative political values, and a deep cynicism
about people, the criminal justice system, and their own departments.98
Officers are said to have an insular and defensive attitude about allegations of
police misconduct,99 and are resistant to change, particularly with reforms that
impinge directly on their on-the-street conduct.100 In the 1960s, police unions
arose in part as expressions of fierce rank and file opposition to programs
designed to improve police–community relations and reduce racial tensions.101
The rank and file and their unions continue to be the principal opponents of
affirmative action in police hiring and the creation of independent citizen
oversight mechanisms.102
The demographics of the American police work force have changed
dramatically over the course of the last few decades, however, calling into
question the traditional concept of the police officer subculture.103 People of
color, women, homosexuals, and college-educated officers are now a
significant presence in most medium-sized to large police departments.104 Law
professor David Sklansky quite properly characterizes police forces today as
“Not Your Father’s Police Department.” 105 African-American officers,
Hispanic officers, or a combination of the two, constitute a majority of the
officers in a growing number of departments.106 Women are also a significant

95. See generally WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY (1970).
96. See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (4th ed. 2011).
97. Walker, supra note 88, at 556, 563, 565.
98. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1210, 1213, 1224, 1233–34, 1241–42.
99. See id. at 1213.
100. SKOLNICK, supra note 96, at 241–42. The Mollen Commission report gave special
emphasis to the officer subculture and the need to change it if the anti-corruption effort is to
succeed. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 51–69.
101. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
199 (2d ed. 1998).
102. Id. at 199–200.
103. See Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1213–23.
104. See id. (discussing people of color, women, and homosexuals); O. Elmer Polk & David
A. Armstrong, Higher Education and Law Enforcement Career Paths: Is the Road to Success
Paved by Degree?, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 77, 79 (2001) (discussing college–educated officers).
105. Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1209.
106. Id. at 1214. In 2003, African-American and Hispanic officers constituted about 11
percent and 9 percent, respectively, of all sworn officers in local police departments. MATTHEW J.
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presence, although there appears to be a ceiling in the range of twenty percent
of all officers.107 Finally, gay and lesbian officers are open about their sexual
orientation in a number of departments.108 The demographic fragmentation of
police departments is indicated by the existence of private associations for
African-American,109 Latino,110 female,111 and lesbian and gay officers.112
Education levels have also risen significantly since the years when the
subculture stereotype first emerged.113
Research and anecdotal evidence indicates significant variations in
attitudes among police officers of different backgrounds. A Police Foundation
survey of officer attitudes toward the use of force found striking differences
based on race. African-American officers were much more willing to concede
that officers in their department did use excessive force, and that officers were
more likely to use excessive force against people of color.114 There are
examples of African-American officers, through their race-based professional
associations, speaking out on police misconduct in ways that are very different
from the views of the police union representing a majority of the
department.115 Susan Martin, meanwhile, examined the impact on the officer
subculture in her study of the early years of female officers being assigned to
routine patrol duty.116 The introduction of women on an equal basis with men

HICKMAN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LOCAL
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2003, at 7 (2006).
107. Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1219–22.
108. The Gay Officers Action League (GOAL) has chapters in different cities and regions.
See Goal-Links, GAY OFFICERS ACTION LEAGUE, http://www.goalny.org/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2013).
109. NATIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION, http://www.blackpolice.org (last visited Jan.
10, 2013).
110. NATIONAL LATINO PEACE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.nlpoa.com (last visited
Jan. 10, 2013).
111. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN POLICE, http://www.iawp.org (last visited
Jan. 10, 2013).
112. GAY OFFICERS ACTION LEAGUE, supra note 108.
113. Polk & Armstrong, supra note 104, at 79.
114. See DAVID WEISBURD & ROSANN GREENSPAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE
ATTITUDES TOWARD ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY 8–9 (2000).
115. Sklansky, supra note 87, at 1230–31. The National Black Police Association maintains
an official position that “[p]olice brutality must be confronted, controlled, and outlawed by all
police departments throughout the United States.” Positions of the National Black Police
Association, NATIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION, http://blackpolice.org/nbpapositions.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013). The National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
(NOBLE) advertises itself as “[t]he Conscience of Law Enforcement.” About Us, NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF BLACK LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES, http://www.noblenatl.org/about
us.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
116. SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN, BREAKING AND ENTERING: POLICEWOMEN ON PATROL 90–
108 (1980).
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challenged the traditional police ethos of masculinity, exposed divisions
among male officers with regard to women in policing, and added complex
new issues regarding social relations and sexual harassment among officers.117
The increased demographic diversity of the American police work force is
relevant to the subject of this Article because if the officer subculture is not as
monolithic as traditionally portrayed, there are potential sources of support for
innovation and accountability-related reform within police departments. Both
the National Police Research Platform and the Chicago CAPS program provide
empirical support for this proposition.118 While this evidence provides some
basis for optimism, Skogan reminds us of the difficulty of getting the rank and
file to support innovation—accountability-related reforms in particular.119
Innovations require officers to “do many of their old jobs in new ways,” and
some of these tasks often “lie outside the traditional roles for which they were
selected and trained” and in which they have much experience.120 This is
particularly true of early intervention systems (EIS), which involve not just a
new accountability tool but new demands on supervisors’ time,121 and—more
seriously—an entirely new approach to personnel performance evaluation.122
B.

Police Unions and Their Impact

Police unions are arguably the most important, neglected aspect of
American policing.123 Listening to everyday rhetoric, it seems that virtually
everyone with an interest in policing—citizens, civic leaders, reform activists,
and scholars—believes that police unions are extremely powerful, have a
major influence on police practices, and are a principal obstacle to change.124
While the police officer subculture and police unions overlap in many
important respects, it is necessary to distinguish between certain attitudes and
behaviors as inherent in the law enforcement occupation and police unions as
an institution. Unions with formal collective bargaining agreements exist in

117. See id. at 156.
118. MEGAN ALDERDEN ET AL., NAT’L POLICE RESEARCH PLATFORM, THE
DIVERSIFICATION OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS 2 (2011), available at http://uicclj.squarespace.com/
storage/updated-papers/The%20Diversification%20of%20Police%20Departments%20FINAL
2.pdf; SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 43, at 105–07.
119. Skogan, supra note 10, at 26.
120. Id.
121. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 59, at 49–50.
122. SAMUEL WALKER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: A PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE 8 (2003); see infra Part
IV.B.
123. Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important
Areas of Policing, 9 POL. PRACT. & RES. 95, 95–111 (2008).
124. But see Skogan, supra note 10, at 28 (finding that in Chicago the police union agreed
early on to support the CAPS community policing experiment).
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about half of all local law enforcement agencies, representing 71 percent of all
sworn officers.125 Thus, to the extent that there are certain attitudes and
behaviors associated with police officers, they are also found in those police
departments where there is no union and collective bargaining agreement.126
As already noted, the relevance of police unions for purposes of this
Article is the extent to which they are or can be an obstacle to change.127
Collective bargaining agreements, for example, contain provisions related to
the investigation of alleged officer misconduct (whether on the basis of a
citizen complaint or an internally generated complaint) that impede a timely
and thorough investigation.128 Officer appeals of discipline, meanwhile, may
involve procedures that tend to increase the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions
being mitigated or overturned.129 Finally, unions—as institutions with financial
resources and political influence—can effectively resist accountability-related
reforms in those departments where they exist.130 The most obvious example
of the negative impact of this political influence on police reform would be
unions helping to elect mayors who are sympathetic to their perspective and
who may appoint a police chief who is not committed to high standards of
accountability.
C. Variations Among Police Departments
The traditional concept of the police officer subculture suggests that all
police are the same in all departments.131 Growing evidence, however, suggests
this is not true and that there are meaningful differences between
departments.132 Additionally, individual departments change sometimes slowly
and sometimes dramatically as a result of new leadership.133 Anecdotal
evidence has always suggested that some departments have reputations for
being more professional than others, while some departments have ingrained
patterns of corruption and officer violence against citizens.134 Unfortunately,
125. HICKMAN & REAVES, supra note 106, at 12. Unionism is weakest in the southeast region
of the U.S. and in all small agencies. Id.
126. WALKER, supra note 101, at 150; MARGARET LEVI, BUREAUCRATIC INSURGENCY: THE
CASE OF POLICE UNIONS 131–32 (1977).
127. Skogan, supra note 10, at 28–29.
128. Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 212–13, 236–
37 (2005).
129. Id. at 233.
130. Walker, supra note 123, at 100-01.
131. Eugene A. Paoline III, Shedding Light on Police Culture: An Examination of Officers’
Occupational Attitudes, 7 POLICE Q. 205, 205–06 (2004).
132. Id. at 206.
133. Skogan, supra note 10, at 32–33 (offering compelling examples of dramatic change,
including the demise of promising reforms in some police departments due to leadership change).
134. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 485.
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no systematic research has investigated these various reputations to confirm or
refute their validity.135 Recent research from the National Police Research
Platform (NPRP), however, provides evidence of significant differences
among police departments, particularly with regard to receptivity to
innovation.136
The idea that the organizational environment of police departments might
vary in important respects should not be that surprising. The literature on
criminal courts, for example, has identified significant differences in the work
environment of different court systems and how those differences impact the
processing of cases.137 The variations among police departments, if validated
and amplified by further research, offer some hope for changing the subculture
of individual departments and, by extension, hope for institutionalizing
reforms. Variations are believed to be the result of certain management
practices—suggesting that officer behavior is malleable and responsive to the
rules, rewards, and punishments within an organization.138 If this is true, it
suggests that a concerted reform effort—with a special focus on taking steps
necessary to sustain organizational changes—could in fact change the police
subculture, substantially diminishing resistance to new accountability reforms.
New evidence from the National Police Research Platform (NPRP)
provides important evidence-based reasons for optimism about the possibilities
for changing the officer subculture within police departments.139 The NPRP is
an ambitious long-term study of police organizations and their officers
involving twenty-nine police departments across the country.140 Several
research reports generated by the NPRP to date are relevant for this Article.
The NPRP report, The Longitudinal Study of First Line Supervisors, involved
169 newly appointed first line supervisors who participated in 16 training
classes in 3 departments.141 The new supervisors were presented with a
scenario involving a problem for supervisors and then surveyed before and
after their training.142 The percentage of the supervisors agreeing or strongly

135. Id.
136. MASTROFSKI & ROSENBAUM, supra note 92, at 5.
137. See generally JEFFREY T. ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING: COURT
COMMUNITIES UNDER SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1997) (using plural words in the title indicates
the varieties of court cultures that exist).
138. Measuring Police Organizations and their ‘Life Course,’ NAT’L POLICE RESEARCH
PLATFORM, http://www.nationalpoliceresearch.org/measuring-police-organizations/ (last visited
Jan. 10, 2013).
139. NAT’L POLICE RESEARCH PLATFORM, supra note 92.
140. Id.
141. LORIE FRIDELL ET AL., NAT’L POLICE RESEARCH PLATFORM, THE LONGITUDINAL
STUDY OF FIRST LINE SUPERVISORS 2 (2011), available at uicclj.squarespace.com/storage/up
dated-papers/Longitudinal%20Supervisor%20Study.pdf.
142. Id. at 2–4.
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agreeing with the statement “[s]ome officers are productive, others are not;
nothing you can do” dropped from 18 percent before training to 10 percent
after training.143 In short, training on the point in question substantially reduced
supervisor fatalism about the capacity to change rank and file officer behavior
through effective supervision.144 Training over specific techniques of
supervision also produced impressive results. New supervisors were less likely
to “wait and see” in response to an incident (from 17 to 8 percent), and more
likely to “meet right away” (from 86 to 95 percent), “warn of consequences”
(from 65 to 72 percent), and take “time to explain” (from 78 to 91 percent).145
The NPRP report on Receptivity to Police Innovation: A Tale of Two
Cities, meanwhile, undermines the traditional myth that the police subculture is
resistant to change and to accountability-related changes in particular.146 First,
the study found that officers in Department B had a far more favorable view of
their agency’s receptivity to innovation than officers in Department A,147
confirming the view that police departments vary on this dimension. The two
departments also varied consistently with regard to specific innovations, with
Department B being far more receptive than Department A.148 A troubling
finding, given the focus of this Article, was that in both departments, EIS were
less popular compared with respectful policing, “hot spots” policing, and crime
analysis units.149 As discussed, infra, EIS is a vital accountability-related
reform. Positively, Department B was more favorable than Department A on
all of the twelve innovations, adding further support to the view that
departments vary in terms of organizational culture.150
IV. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PATTERN OR PRACTICE LITIGATION
A.

The Goals, Achievements, and Limitations of Pattern or Practice
Litigation

The most significant initiative regarding organizational change in policing
involves U.S. Department of Justice “pattern or practice” investigations of
police departments under Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994. Unlike criminal prosecutions and tort actions, the
explicit purpose of this statute is not to punish individual officers or seek
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 7; see also ROSENBAUM ET AL., The Life Course of New Supervisors, in THE
NATIONAL POLICE RESEARCH PLATFORM DRAFT FINAL REPORT 6-1, 6-9. But see Skogan, supra
note 10, at 25–26 (discussing front-line supervisors as a force in opposing reform).
146. MASTROFSKI & ROSENBAUM, supra note 92.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 6.
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redress for particular incidents of misconduct, but to achieve organizational
reform.151 Settlements of investigations by the Special Litigation Section have
resulted in consent decrees, MOAs, and investigative findings letters in over
twenty agencies.152 As noted above, some evidence indicates that several of the
consent decrees and MOAs were successful in achieving significant
organizational change.153 The important and as-of-yet unexamined question is
whether the achieved reforms endure following the lifting of the consent
decree or MOA, and become an institutionalized part of the organizational
culture of the police departments in question.
The various consent decrees and MOAs negotiated by the Justice
Department contain three principal accountability-related reforms: state of the
art use of force policies (broadly defined to include different forms of use of
force and also procedures for the investigation of force incidents), an early
intervention system (EIS), and an open and accessible citizen complaint
process.154 Use of force policies are designed to provide proper guidance for
officers. The citizen complaint process is designed to provide citizens with an
effective avenue of redress in situations where they believe a police officer’s
conduct was improper or unsatisfactory. And the EIS is a computerized
database on officer performance that allows police managers to monitor that
performance and take appropriate remedial action toward officers who exhibit
a pattern of questionable behavior.155
The experience of more than twenty settlements has indicated that the three
reforms cited above involve far more than simply adding discrete elements to
the management of a police department (e.g., the use of force policy). In
practice, they involve a wholesale transformation of the organization related to
accountability.156 The development of state of the art use of force policies, for
example, requires a systematic policy development process within a
department, often where one did not previously exist.157 New use of force
policies further require both effective training of officers in a department
where in-service training has been haphazard, inadequate, or even possibly
non-existent, and meaningful supervision of officers. Meaningful supervision
includes, among other things, utilization of an EIS by sergeants to closely

151. See Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/crt/about/spl/police.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (describing the mission of the Special
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice); Walker &
Macdonald, supra note 46, at 479.
152. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 486.
153. Id. at 479–80.
154. Id. at 504; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 151 (examining any of the
consent decrees confirms their basic similarity in terms of the required reforms).
155. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 505, 507, 508–09.
156. Id. at 481.
157. Id. at 493, 505.
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monitor the performance of officers under their command.158 An EIS,
meanwhile, requires not just training over the formal mechanics of the system
(reviewing officer performance data, identifying officers in need of
intervention), but an entirely new way of conducting police supervision: the
systematic review of data, identification of performance patterns, and
undertaking non-disciplinary forms of intervention to correct officers’
behavior. These steps all involve changes in the traditional work habits of
police sergeants—in short, a significant change in the organizational culture of
the department.159 Managing the implementation of the many reforms
simultaneously under the deadline imposed by the consent decree or MOA
proved to be a challenge itself in some departments.160 Even in those cases
where the independent monitors eventually concluded that particular
departments had been successfully transformed for the better, most
departments failed to achieve full compliance within the required five-year
time frame.161
Justice Department pattern and practice litigation since 1994 has been a
major new reform effort with regard to police accountability.162 While there is
some evidence of success in several departments,163 many questions remain
unanswered. Missing from the mandated reforms, however, has been any
mechanism designed to enhance the likelihood that the reforms achieved will
be sustained over the long term.164 This issue, and a proposed remedy, is
discussed infra in Part V.
B.

Early Intervention Systems as an Organizational Reform Tool

An EIS (often referred to as an “early warning system”) is a major
component of all the DOJ-negotiated consent decrees and MOAs.165 This
Section argues that an EIS is a potentially vital tool for transforming the
culture of a police department and a key to ensuring the continuity of
accountability-related reforms. The EIS has emerged in recent decades as a
powerful police accountability tool—providing a data driven process for

158. See id. at 510.
159. Id. at 508, 529.
160. See RACHEL BURGESS ET AL., SEVENTH STATUS REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
MONITORING TEAM (2005), available at http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/police/docu
ments/webcontent/dowd005029.pdf.
161. Pittsburgh did achieve compliance on time, but as of this writing (spring 2012) the
Oakland, California, Police Department was facing the prospect of being placed in Receivership
by the federal judge because of its failure to achieve compliance. Shoshana Walter, Oakland
Police Caught Between Reform and Crime Surge, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2012, at A19.
162. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 481.
163. Id. at 519.
164. Id. at 532–35.
165. Id. at 504.
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identifying officers with performance problems and for making informed
decisions about interventions needed to correct officer performance
problems.166
An EIS is a computerized database of officer performance with anywhere
from five to twenty-five or more performance indicators (citizen complaints,
uses of force, arrests, traffic stops, etc.).167 Research and anecdotal evidence
has confirmed the long-standing belief that in any police department a small
group of officers are responsible for a majority of problem incidents (excessive
force, citizen complaints).168 The EIS database establishes a foundation for
making meaningful performance evaluations of officers.169 In this regard, it
should be noted that assessments of police personnel evaluation systems—
published twenty years apart—were both highly critical of those systems.170
An EIS represents a great leap forward over traditional performance
assessment systems for the simple reason that it includes data on officer
performance rather than subjective assessments.171 Officers identified by the
EIS (according the parameters established for the system) are then referred for
intervention to correct the performance problems.172 Intervention may involve
informal or formal counseling by supervisors, referral to professional
counseling (e.g., family or substance abuse counseling), retraining, or other
options.173 The special power of an EIS is that it has the capacity to identify an
officer’s specific performance problem (e.g., use of force, rudeness, special
problem with dealing with young men or people of color), and its sources
(personal family problems, substance abuse), and select an intervention related
to the identified problem.174 This problem-oriented response is presumptively
more effective than traditional group-based interventions (e.g., race and ethnic
awareness class) that may be irrelevant for most of the officers in the group.175
If used to its fullest capacity,176 an EIS has the potential for transforming
the organizational culture of a police department and sustaining reform in
166. Id. at 508.
167. Id. at 509.
168. See WALKER, supra note 72, at 21.
169. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 508.
170. The lack of progress over the intervening twenty years is both very depressing and
telling about some deeper problem in police management. FRANK J. LANDY, PERFORMANCE
APPRAISAL IN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1 (1977); TIMOTHY N. OETTMEIER & MARY ANN
WYCOFF, PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN THE COMMUNITY POLICING CONTEXT 5
(1997).
171. Walker & Macdonald, supra note 46, at 509.
172. Id. The proper parameters or thresholds for EIS are a matter of considerable debate. Id.
173. Id.
174. See WALKER, supra note 122, at 5, 19.
175. Id. at 36.
176. Id. at 55. This qualification is necessary because there is substantial anecdotal evidence
of EIS that are planned but not implemented, implemented inadequately, or implemented and then

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

78

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:57

several respects.177 First, an EIS is itself a significant institutional change.178
Second, as an institutionalized part of a department it has direct ramifications
for other accountability mechanisms.179 Use of force reports and citizen
complaints are major indicators in an EIS.180 Third, the data provided by the
EIS has (potentially) an important empowering effect for supervisors, enabling
them to document the performance problems of officers who are identified.181
Thus, assessments of performance are no longer a matter of subjective
opinions about good or bad police performance. As discussed above, however,
fully utilizing the capacity of an EIS requires a significant change in the work
routine of sergeants who are the front-line supervisors. This includes what
sergeants do (analysis of data, etc.), how they spend their time (more time at
their desks than on the street), and how they deal with officers under their
command (more non-disciplinary forms of intervention rather than
conventional disciplinary actions).
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING ACCOUNTABILITY-RELATED
REFORM
A.

Charlotte, North Carolina, as a Case Study

The challenge of institutionalizing police reform, including accountabilityrelated reforms, as noted at the beginning of this Article, has been neglected by
police scholars.182 The most relevant study involves the institutionalization of
problem-oriented policing in the Charlotte, North Carolina Police
Department.183 While it is not directly related to accountability procedures, the
Charlotte Police Department study and the policies and procedures adopted by
that department provide a framework for a process to institutionalize police
reforms.
The Charlotte Police Department sought to institutionalize problem
orientated policing (POP) through formal training, building POP into regular
personnel evaluations and promotional procedures, and revising various
departmental policies accordingly.184 In addition to several retreats, that in
effect constituted in-service training, a federal grant funded special training—

not used to their fullest extent, or allowed to deteriorate. There has been no systematic research to
assess the extent to which police departments utilize their EIS and whether the police
department’s implementation involves the system’s minimum or its full capabilities.
177. Id. at 15.
178. Id. at 55.
179. Id. at 60.
180. See WALKER, supra note 122, at 6.
181. Id. at 77–78.
182. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 5.
183. Id. at 14.
184. Id. at 13.
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for sergeants, and regular monthly meetings related to POP were instituted.185
The study of this process involved a survey of 150 randomly selected rank and
file officers regarding their knowledge, attitudes, and behavior about POP.186
The study’s hypothesis was that if officers did not know about or were hostile
to POP, one could safely conclude that POP had not been institutionalized in
the department.187 The study also included structured interviews with all thirtythree captains, and an examination of departmental policies and procedures
related to POP.188 The principal finding was that POP had been successfully
institutionalized in the department.189 Only one rank and file officer had not
heard of POP. Half (49.2 percent) of officers felt it was a “valuable tool in
dealing with crime and fear of crime,” and 95.8 percent reported that they had
engaged in POP in some way.190 Among the captains, all but one demonstrated
knowledge of POP, and 70 percent of the captains were able to provide a
“strong definition” of the concept of problem oriented policing.191 “Strong
definition” was operationalized as a detailed description of POP as opposed to
a short, clichéd response that would suggest little meaningful understanding of
the concept.192 Finally, 88 percent of the captains reported that they informally
discussed POP with other officers on a somewhat regular basis.193 The
interview questions on this point were designed to assess whether POP was
part of the “day-to-day language and culture” of the department.194
With respect to training, all thirty-three captains and 89.1 percent of the
rank and file reported that they had participated in some formal training
regarding POP.195 At the time of the study, new recruits received
approximately three days of police academy training related to POP.196 In the
field-training program (led by Police Training Officers, or PTOs), each trainee
was required to develop a POP project and present the findings to the
department.197
With regard to departmental practices, POP was made a factor in both
performance evaluations and the promotional process.198 The vast majority
185. Id. at 11.
186. Id. at 13.
187. Id. at 13.
188. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 13.
189. Id. at 14.
190. Id. at 17.
191. Id. at 16.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 16.
194. IKERD & WALKER, supra note 13, at 16.
195. Id. at 20.
196. Id. at 21. In the context of standard police academy training, where a four-hour training
period on a particular subject is common, a three-day block of time is noteworthy.
197. Id. at 21.
198. IKERD AND WALKER, supra note 13, at 22.
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(86.6 percent) of the rank and file and 76 percent of the captains reported that
they were aware that it was a part of their performance evaluations, while 82.4
percent of the rank and file and 70 percent of the captains reported they were
aware it was a factor in promotions.199 Significantly, 85 percent of the captains
reported that they had been rewarded for their POP-related efforts.200
The findings regarding knowledge, attitudes and behavior clearly suggest
that the department had indeed taken formal steps to institutionalize POP and
that the effort, as measured in this research project, was successful.201
However, several cautionary comments about the study are in order. The study
involved only one department202 and the absence of a comparison department
or departments with a different approach or history regarding POP precludes a
richer contextual perspective. Additionally, the study was done at what might
prove to be a high point in the department’s commitment to POP, a fact that
might explain the extremely positive results on all of the indicators. Since the
survey, a new police chief has arrived, and the level of commitment to POP at
the present time is not known.203
The framework employed in the Charlotte study sheds useful perspective
on other police reform efforts, and whether any similar attempts to
institutionalize the reform in question were taken. With regard to the 1970s
NYPD anti-corruption effort, for example, the Mollen Commission reported
years later that no steps were taken to create “institutional mechanisms” to
sustain the reforms.204 With regard to COP, there is no evidence that, with a
few exceptions, cities provided mandatory training of all officers regarding its
goals and methods.205 One exception appears to have been the Chicago CAPS
effort. While the training reached only eighteen hundred officers in a twelve
thousand officer department—it was nonetheless extensive—and this might
account for the generally positive findings reported in the evaluations of
CAPS.206
With regard to team policing, an evaluation of seven experiments in the
1970s found that one factor contributing to failure was that “team members

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 13.
202. Id.
203. A recent review of the department’s website contains only a few passing references to
problem solving, with no descriptions of specific POP programs or a department-wide
commitment. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, http://charmeck.org/city/char
lotte/cmpd/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
204. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 75.
205. SKOGAN AND HARTNETT, supra note 43, at 96 (little or no training regarding COP or
POP in cities other than Chicago is reported). In Houston, Texas, officers “received neither
training nor even a briefing” regarding its Innovative Neighborhood Policing (INOP) program. Id.
206. Id. at 96–104.
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had been left out of the planning,” and as a consequence did not understand the
reform they were to implement and often had “erroneous” ideas about it.207
Scott’s twenty-year assessment of POP, meanwhile, discusses training largely
in terms of national level training that is external to individual departments,
with no reference to the kind of department-level training found in
Charlotte.208
In the various Justice Department consent decrees and MOAs, there is no
evidence that departments were required to undertake, or undertook on their
own initiative, department-wide training about the nature and goals of the
required reforms.209 The Department of Justice 2001 report, Principles for
Promoting Police Integrity, is arguably the closest thing to an official
statement of minimum expectations for policing. The Principles Report
contains only a brief standard on training, but it is confined to training over the
report’s substantive recommendations (e.g., use of force, EIS, citizen
complaints) and is silent with regard to training on the nature, purpose, and
benefits of the required reforms themselves. 210 The MOA between the
Department of Justice, the City of Cincinnati, and the Cincinnati Police
Department, to take one example, follows the approach in the Justice
Department’s Principles report, and requires nothing regarding training or
explanation of the reforms themselves.211
B.

A Model Program for Institutionalizing Accountability-Related Reforms

This Section presents a model program for institutionalizing police
accountability reforms, based on the preceding discussion of the Charlotte
experience and drawing on research discussed earlier in this Article. While the
specific program described here involves accountability related reforms, it has
general relevance for all major reforms or changes within a police department.
The challenge is to change the culture of the department to the point where the
goals and values underlying the reforms are understood, accepted, and actively
supported by a critical mass of officers.212
Training involving accountability-related reforms should include preservice academy training, field training, and in-service training. Each of these

207. SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 67.
208. SCOTT, supra note 15, at 111–15.
209. The police union expressed public opposition to the consent decree and was
consequently not invited to participate in the Implementation Committee. DAVIS ET AL., supra
note 59, at 10.
210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 14.
211. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & the City of Cincinnati,
Ohio & the Cincinnati Police Dep’t (Apr. 12, 2002) (on file with author).
212. No attempt is made here to define of what that “critical mass” would consist. It may not
necessarily involve a majority of all officers. Determining the “tipping point” where a critical
mass begins to exist should be the subject of future empirical research.
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training units should cover the nature of the specific reform or reforms, the
underlying values, and the potential benefits to the department, individual
officers, and the community. The potential benefits of accountability-related
reforms are arguably the most neglected aspect of the reform process. Officers,
for example, generally view stricter use of force policies as an intrusion on
their discretion and essentially a means by which supervisors can catch and
punish them.213 All training units should emphasize the extent to which clear
policies on use of force or other officer actions in critical incidents, however
restrictive, provide necessary and useful guidance regarding which actions are
prohibited or approved in given situations. The potential benefits to officers
include helping them avoid actions that are likely to generate a citizen
complaint or an internally generated complaint.214 Research on citizen
complaints, for example, suggests that being the subject of complaint
investigations is one of the greatest sources of low morale among police
officers.215 Some law enforcement experts involved with EIS talk in terms of
the system’s purpose being to “save” officers’ careers—by identifying their
performance problems early and providing the proper intervention to correct
those problems—saving them from the costs of use of force or citizen
complaint investigations as well as having such incidents on their performance
record.216 The EIS is the source of discontent among rank and file officers and
supervisors.217 Rank and file officers tend to regard it as a “big brother” system
whose primary purpose it is to catch and discipline officers.218 To the extent
that an EIS gives management a documented record, there is some truth to that
perception.219 Training should emphasize the point that it is intended to be
activated only in the case of officers with repeated performance problems. One
of the major complaints among many officers is that the department does not
punish those officers whose performance is inadequate or unprofessional.220
An EIS also has the potential for identifying exemplary officer performance,
which could be measured in terms of a low ratio of citizen complaints and use
of force incidents to arrests or field and traffic stops or both.221

213. MOLLEN COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 63–64.
214. JAYSON WECHTER, S.F. OFFICE OF CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, INVESTIGATING CITIZEN
COMPLAINTS IS DIFFERENT: THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES OF INVESTIGATING CITIZEN
COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS 8–9 (2004).
215. Id.
216. WALKER, supra note 122, at 3.
217. SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED
POLICING SERVS., SUPERVISION & INTERVENTION WITHIN EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES 36 (2005).
218. Id. at 37–38.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 38.
221. Id. at 5.
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The benefits to the department include time saved through a reduction in
the number of allegations of misconduct,222 a reduction in lawsuits against the
department,223 and a general improvement in community relations.224 Training
could emphasize the potential public relations value of EIS data. Where the
data documents decline in use of force incidents, it would communicate to the
public that the department is vigilant in monitoring the performance of its
officers and quick to take action to correct problems that appear. Traditionally,
a police department’s claims that it vigorously enforces its rules are greeted
with great skepticism by much of the public.225 This response is in large part
because the claims are never supported by data, and the department has already
lost trust among critical segments of the public.226 An EIS potentially
overcomes this problem by supporting claims with data.227 An increase in use
of force incidents, on the other hand, would alert the department to the need for
an inquiry into the causes of that increase and the need to take corrective
action.
In-service training is extremely important in order to ensure continuous
reinforcement of specific programs and procedures and the values underlying
them. In service training should include both classroom and roll call
training.228 In this regard, we should note the California POST standard that
requires training on a set of “perishable skills,”229 which include a minimum of
twelve hours every two years, with a minimum of four hours each on “Arrest
and Control,” “Driver Training/Awareness or Driving Simulator,” and
“Tactical Firearms or Force Options Simulator.”230 The concept of perishable
skills recognizes that certain skills easily erode under pressures of the job and
that it is necessary to continually reinforce those skills though training. This
principle certainly applies to all accountability-related reforms.231
Accountability-related reforms should also be reinforced by including
them in performance evaluations and the promotional process—following the
Charlotte example. An officer’s performance evaluation, for example, should

222. Id. at 5. The efficiencies arising from time saved for both officers subject to
investigations and investigators could be readily quantified through a properly designed study,
but no such study presently exists.
223. WALKER ET AL., supra note 217, at 5, 6.
224. Id.
225. SAMUEL WALKER, WHAT REAL POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY LOOKS LIKE: THE “120
SHOTS” INCIDENT & THE LOS ANGELES SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT RESPONSE 7 (2005).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 41.
228. SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 43, at 104–05.
229. Perishable Skills Program, CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND
TRAINING, http://post.ca.gov/perishable-skills-program.aspx (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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include a review of his or her record in the EIS. Even though an officer has not
been identified by the system for intervention, there are undoubtedly many
cases of officers with a higher than average number of problematic indicators
(uses of force, citizen complaints, excessive use of leave time) that should be
properly noted in the performance evaluation. Similarly, the EIS record should
be a major consideration in considering officers for promotion. In this regard,
it should be noted that the Christopher Commission report on the LAPD
following the 1991 Rodney King incident found that (in that pre-EIS era) the
department did not use available information such as use of force incidents,
citizen complaints, or even disciplinary records in promotional decisions.232 In
fact, the Christopher Commission found cases of officers given laudatory
evaluations or promotions despite records that included serious incidents of
officer misconduct.233
Evidence on policing cited in this Article suggests that properly designed
training can be effective in changing the police officer subculture. The
traditional concept of a homogenous subculture resistant to change appears no
longer valid. The police officer work force is now far more diverse than in the
past.234 Some elements of that work force are more receptive to change than
others.235 Significant variations have been found among police departments
with regard to receptivity to change.236 Finally, properly designed training does
appear to improve officer receptivity to innovation and change.237 In short,
there are pockets of support or potential support for accountability-related
reform within the American police work force that can be exploited.
C. Monitoring the Continuity of Reforms
Assuming that accountability reforms are instituted and a department
adopts the program described in the above section to ensure the continuity of
those reforms, the question becomes how to ensure the continuity-related effort
itself continues. The following discussion argues that the police auditor form
of citizen oversight represents the best answer to that question.
The police auditor arose in the mid-1990s as an alternative to citizen
review boards.238 Police auditors should not be confused with what are
commonly referred to as independent police monitors. In common policing
232. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 140–42 (1991).
233. Id. at 143–44. Note the LAPD’s failure to take into account the misconduct of forty-four
officers the Christopher Commission identified as having the highest rate of involvement in use
of force incidents. Id. at 40–41.
234. Id. at 71.
235. WALKER, supra note 18, at 183.
236. Id. at 180.
237. Id. at 183–84.
238. Id. at 135.
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usage, the term independent monitor refers to a court-appointed official
(although in practice usually a team of experts) with responsibility for
monitoring the implementation of a consent decree or MOA.239 The monitor is
an officer of the court, its role is limited to the specific terms of the consent
decree or MOA, and it goes out of existence once the decree or MOA is lifted
by the court.240 A police auditor, by contrast, is a permanent municipal, county,
or state agency whose role involves auditing, monitoring or reviewing any and
every aspect of the police agency under his or her purview.241 Police auditors
are different from citizen review boards primarily in that the latter investigate
and review individual citizen complaints against police officers for purposes of
determining whether the complaint is valid and the officer acted wrongly.242
Thus, civilian review boards may be defined as embodying a “justice” model
of oversight—oriented toward determining right or wrong with regard to a
particular incident—while police auditors embody a “policy” model, oriented
toward reviewing and potentially changing departmental policies.243 Review
boards are retrospective, examining what happened,244 while police auditors
are prospective, seeking to influence future actions.245 Police auditors may
respond to particular incidents or controversies, but their primary responsibility
is to review policies and procedures of the agency under their purview and to
make recommendations for change.246 Particularly important, police auditors
have the power to initiate investigations of any issue at their own discretion
and are not limited to the terms of a consent decree or MOA.247 The Special
Counsel to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, for example, has
investigated innumerable issues since 1993, with most of those embracing a
number of subsidiary issues.248 Police auditors do not have the power to
mandate changes, however.249 Their power lies in their capacity to investigate

239. Id. at 144.
240. Id.
241. WALKER, supra note 18, at 136. Police auditors have a variety of different official
names—the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, auditor, for example, is the Integrity and Accountability
Office (IAO). Id. at 136–37. This author has sought to clarify discussions by using generic terms
based on the respective functions of different offices and agencies.
242. Id. at 135.
243. Id. at 144.
244. Id.
245. Id. Some citizen review boards have original jurisdiction to investigate citizen
complaints; others review investigations conducted by the police department’s internal affairs or
professional standards unit.
246. Id. at 136.
247. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 144.
248. See Index of LASD Reports, POLICE ASSESSMENT RES. CTR., http://www.parc.info/
client_files/LASD/12-12%20LASD%20Index.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
249. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 140.
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broadly and to make their findings and recommendations public.250 Finally, it
should be noted that some oversight agencies, such as the Office of Police
Complaints, combine both complaint review and auditing functions.251
Particularly relevant for this Article are the examples of police auditors
identifying the deterioration of important reforms the departments experienced
under their purview. In 2003, for example, the Special Counsel to the LASD
issued a highly critical report finding that the department’s EIS (known as the
Personnel Performance Index [PPI]) had declined in some important respects
and was not being used to its full capacity.252 The PPI, at that time, was widely
regarded as perhaps the best EIS in the nation, and it had served as a model for
systems in other departments.253 The Special Counsel, however, found that the
PPI was not being used to its fullest capacity and suffered from a number of
problems.254 These included failure to enter data in a timely manner, a high
rate of errors (more than 50 percent) in citizen complaint reports,
inconsistencies in the reporting of certain incidents, and a lack of
understanding about the PPI on the part of some supervisors.255 A follow-up
report a year later found that the LASD had made significant progress in
correcting the problems identified in the previous report.256
A second example, also from the Special Counsel to the LASD, involves
the checkered history of the Century Station (what would be called a precinct
station in most departments).257 The station was marked by a number of
problems in the early 1990s, including a high rate of officer-involved
shootings, a very bad image of the Station in the community, and, within the

250. See id. at 141.
251. See Office of Police Complaints, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, http://policecomplaints.
dc.gov/page/about-office-police-complaints (last visited Nov. 20, 2012). The New York City
Civilian Complaint Review Board and the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints, while
nominally review boards, have also issued auditor-style reports. See Mission Statement and Rules,
N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/mission.html
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012); Office of Citizen Complaints, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., http://www.sf
gov3.org/index.aspx?page=419 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
252. See MERRICK J. BOBB ET AL., L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 16TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT
2 (2003), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/LASD/16th%20Semiannual%20
Report.pdf.
253. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 152.
254. See BOBB ET AL., supra note 252, at 44.
255. See id. at 43–59 (outlining in detail the various problems contributing to the
underutilization of PPI).
256. See MERRICK J. BOBB ET. AL., L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 18TH SEMIANNUAL
REPORT 47–56 (2004), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/LASD/18th%20Semiannual
%20Report.pdf (outlining improvements including reducing data entry lags and increasing the
accuracy of documentation in the PPI database).
257. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 151–52.
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department, low officer morale and a high rate of officer turnover.258
Investigation by the Special Counsel found several serious management
deficiencies: a sergeant-to-officer span of control that was twice the
department’s own standard of eight to one;259 use of the station as a training
ground for new officers;260 low morale and a desire for most officers to transfer
out as quickly as possible.261 A series of changes corrected many of these
problems and the number of shootings had declined substantially—despite the
fact that external factors such as the crime rate and community violence
remained stable.262 Several management reforms contributed to this positive
development: the Station had for the first time a full complement of lieutenants
and sergeants, sergeants were spending more time in the field, supervisors
imposed stricter standards for arrests (resulting in a decline in the number of
arrests), standards for selecting field training officers had been raised, and the
department had reduced the number of officer foot pursuits which were related
to many shootings in the past.263 In 2001, however, the Special Counsel
revisited the station and found that standards had eroded and the number of
officer-involved shootings had returned to high levels compared with other
Stations in the LASD. The captain responsible for the successful reforms had
transferred out.264
The Special Counsel to the LASD reports on the Century Station
illuminate a problem that is inherent in policing and important to the subject of
this Article. While the initial improvements in the Century Station were
impressive, the speed with which they deteriorated is deeply troubling. There is
reason to believe that the Century Station experience is a common
phenomenon in American police departments, and this only heightens the
importance of devising procedures to ensure the continuity of reforms.
The work of the Denver, Colorado, Office of the Independent Monitor
(OIM) provides an example of how a police auditor can address a full range of
accountability-related issues to ensure their continuity. The 2010 OIM Annual

258. See id.
259. MERRICK J. BOBB & STAFF, L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 9TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT
23 (1998), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/LASD/9th%20Semiannual%20Re
port.pdf. A proper span of control is regarded by law enforcement professionals as a vital element
in an effective system of supervision. See WALKER, supra note 18, at 181–82.
260. BOBB & STAFF, supra note 259, at 18.
261. Id. at 8.
262. See id. at 7–34; see also MERRICK J. BOBB & STAFF, L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T,
13TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 7–15 (2000), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/LASD/
13th%20Semiannual%20Report.pdf.
263. See BOBB & STAFF, supra note 262, at 11–15.
264. See MERRICK J. BOBB ET. AL., L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 14TH SEMIANNUAL
REPORT 84 n.13 (2001), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/LASD/14th%20Semi
annual%20Report.pdf.
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Report provides a status report on its six goals for the year.265 The goals
include: implementing the recommendations of an outside report on policies
related to deadly force or other forms of force;266 a continuation of the citizen
complaint mediation program;267 conducting an annual evaluation of the
Denver Police Department’s EIS (known as the Personnel Assessment System
[PAS]);268 monitoring the implementation of the Denver Sheriff’s
Department’s disciplinary matrix (a new management tool designed to ensure
consistency in disciplinary actions);269 improving the timeliness of imposition
of discipline in the Denver Police Department;270 and evaluating the police
department’s policies, training, and practices related to alleged “excited
delirium” cases.271
The Denver OIM list and discussion of goals for the year is ambitious and
impressive. All of the items involve accountability-related reforms, including
all three of the major items in DOJ-negotiated consent decrees and MOAs: use
of force policies, the EIS, and the citizen complaint process. Indeed, what is
particularly impressive is the comprehensive nature of the auditing process by
the OIM—covering such a wide range of issues.272
The work of the Omaha Police Auditor, currently inactive due to the
termination of the initial auditor in 2006, offers an example of a missed
opportunity in police auditing, which resulted in a failure to correct police
problems before they escalate into more serious incidents.273 In a series of

265. See RICHARD ROSENTHAL, OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, 14 to 1-5 (2010), available at http://www.denvergov.org/Portals/374/documents/2010_OIM_
Annual_Report—Finalforweb.pdf.
266. Id. at 1-4.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1-5.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. ROSENTHAL, supra note 265, at 1-5. “Excited delirium” is a behavioral condition that
arises in a certain number of uses of force cases. The 2008 and 2009 annual reports of the OIM
contain similar discussions of Goals, indicating that the process had become institutionalized in
the OIM.
272. Id. at 1-4 to 1-5.
273. See generally TRISTAN BONN, PUBLIC SAFETY AUDITOR, CITY OF OMAHA, ANATOMY
OF TRAFFIC STOPS (2006) [hereinafter TRAFFIC STOPS], available at http://omahapoliceauditor.
files.wordpress.com/2012/06/omahaauditortrafficstopsoct06.pdf; see also TRISTAN BONN,
PUBLIC SAFETY AUDITOR, CITY OF OMAHA, PUBLIC SAFETY AUDITOR’S REPORT (Mar. 31,
2003) [hereinafter MARCH AUDITOR REPORT], available at http://omahapoliceauditor.files.word
press.com/2012/06/psa-2003-1q-report-final.pdf; TRISTAN BONN, PUBLIC SAFETY AUDITOR,
CITY OF OMAHA, PUBLIC SAFETY AUDITOR’S REPORT (June 30, 2004) [hereinafter JUNE
AUDITOR REPORT], available at http://omahapoliceauditor.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/psa2004-2q-report-final.pdf; TRISTAN BONN, PUBLIC SAFETY AUDITOR, CITY OF OMAHA,
QUARTERLY REPORT (Sept. 30, 2004) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER AUDITOR REPORT], available at
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Quarterly Reports and then in a comprehensive report on traffic stop-related
issues, the Omaha Police Auditor documented a variety of practices by Omaha
police officers that ranged from the illegal to the unprofessional—the failure of
the police department to provide adequate training and supervision for officers
and, in some instances, even to enforce its own policies.274 The problems
included vehicle stops and arrests without adequate legal justification, pat
down searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, using visual estimates of
vehicle speed in violation of state statute, failure to conduct after action
reviews of use of force incidents, failure to enforce the department’s policy on
accepting gratuities, and others.275 The Auditor was fired in October 2006, and
improper conduct by officers worsened to the point where a set of very serious
use of force incidents in 2011 prompted a community group request for a
Justice Department pattern or practice investigation.276
In short, the work of various police auditors from around the country
provide instructive examples of how this form of citizen oversight can provide
a form of continuous auditing and monitoring that is likely to ensure that police
departments continue to maintain accountability-related reforms.
It is worth noting that the work of police auditors addresses an issue that is
central to the decades-long controversy over the role of the Supreme Court as
an agency of police accountability. Summarizing and extending this debate,
Rachel Harmon has pointed out that the Supreme Court lacks the institutional
capacity not only to enforce its decisions (apart from appeals that reach the
Court), but also the capacity “to undertake complex empirical analysis of
policing or to constrain the police beyond identifying and enforcing
constitutional rights.”277 Police auditors do have that capacity, are able to
choose issues at their own discretion, and are able to conduct their own
investigations or employ independent experts for investigations.278 The
inherently broad mandate of police auditors addresses the related problem
discussed by Harmon that the focus on key Supreme Court decisions (e.g.,

http://omahapoliceauditor.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/psa-2004-3q-report-final.pdf. The former
police auditor is continuing police oversight work as a private individual.
274. See, e.g., TRAFFIC STOPS, supra note 273, at 6–8 (discussing officers improperly
applying the reasonable articulable suspicion standard).
275. Id. at 3–21. See also JUNE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 273, at 21 (addressing
inadequacies in excessive force complaint procedures); SEPTEMBER AUDITOR REPORT, supra
note 273, at 15–17 (identifying practices and behaviors violating conflict of interest policies).
276. Letter from Omaha Alliance for Justice, to Jonathan M. Smith, Chief, Special Litig.
Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Mar. 13, 2012) (on file with author), available
at http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/DOJLetterFinal.pdf. In the interest of full
disclosure, it needs to be noted that the author of this Article was the principal author of the 2012
Omaha Letter to the Justice Department.
277. Harmon, supra note 82, at 764, 772–76.
278. See supra notes 235–51 and accompanying text.
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Mapp v. Ohio279 and Miranda v. Arizona280), has greatly narrowed the scope of
research and discussions of policing and police accountability to an
unfortunate degree.281 As Harmon states, “scholars take their subject to be
Supreme Court cases involving the Constitution rather than the problem of
policing.”282 It is a truism in police studies that law enforcement activities that
are likely to involve Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues constitute only a
portion of police activities. Focusing on constitutional issues, consequently,
ignores the majority of police–citizen interactions that involve order
maintenance, problem solving, and service. In short, police auditors are not
only a necessary instrument in terms of sustaining police reforms, but can be a
major instrument in a new and broadly defined police reform effort generally.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sustaining accountability-related reforms is an important frontier issue in
policing that has not received sufficient attention from reform activists or
police scholars.283 There is a long history of important reforms that, for one
reason or another, simply faded away.284 Skogan has ably listed the formidable
list of factors that cause reforms to fail, and we should not lose sight of the
challenges that face both instituting and institutionalizing reform in police
departments.285 The problem of sustaining reform, moreover, extends to all
aspects of policing, including: community-oriented policing, problem-oriented
policing, and essentially all aspects of police management.286
This Article has examined the factors related to sustaining reforms
including the impact of the police officer subculture—which many, if not most,
police experts regard as one of the major obstacles to reform and the continuity
of reforms that are achieved.287 Citing research on the changing police officer
work force and new research from the National Police Research Platform—this
Article has argued that the police officer work force is not as monolithic as
traditionally portrayed. There is evidence that some departments and officers
are more amenable to change (and, thus, reform) than others, and properly
designed training can have a positive impact with regard to attitudes toward
accountability-related reform.288
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Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Harmon, supra note 82, at 782–86.
Id. at 783.
Mastrofski & Willis, supra note 5, at 127–28.
Id. at 113.
Skogan, supra note 10, at 23–24.
Id. at 23.
Armacost, supra note 83, at 455.
See supra text accompanying notes 131–145.
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This Article concludes with a recommended model policy to enhance the
sustainability of accountability-related reforms.289 The policy involves
developing training procedures designed to explain the nature, goals, and
benefits of such reforms to all officers in a department.290 Traditional practice
in reform efforts has neglected this dimension of training and its potential
impact on the culture of a department.291 The result is that major reforms—
including Justice Department consent decrees and memoranda of agreement—
appear to rank and file officers as offensive bolts from the blue, without much
warning and even less explanation.292 The model policy involves training
officers to explain major reforms that occur.293 This approach is based on the
example of the institutionalization of problem oriented policing in Charlotte,
North Carolina’s Police Department.294 Research from the National Police
Research Platform suggests that training can increase the receptivity of police
officers to innovations.295
The final element of the model involves continuous external monitoring to
ensure that accountability reforms are being maintained in a department.296 The
experience of several police auditors, and an alternative form of citizen
oversight of the police, provides a practical example of how continuous
monitoring can be achieved.297
In conclusion, maintaining the continuity of accountability-related reforms
in policing is an important problem that has been neglected to date. This
Article has offered a model program for ensuring the continuity of such
reforms by institutionalizing them in a police department based on the
evidence from several different aspects of policing.
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See supra Part V.
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